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Top NY Court Blinks in 'First Department' WPP Discrimination Power Play

Last update: 4:57 p.m. EST Nov. 13, 2008

NEW YORK, Nov 13, 2008 /PRNewswire-USNewswire via COMTEX/ -- In a regular session of the New York Court of Appeals on October 23rd 2008, and under the cover of a contentious election year and an economic tsunami, this state's top court, the New York Court of Appeals (NYCOA) declined to hear the appeal of Kathryn Jordan v. Bates Advertising 118785-99, an important "perceived disability" case filed by a woman with Multiple Sclerosis. The appeal was filed by Jordan after the First Department Appellate Division reversed the May 2005 jury verdict and the Final Judgment of the trial judge, Honorable Rolando T. Acosta, entered in November 2007 to uphold the jury verdict and adopted the arguments of WPP's appellate and trial attorneys that victims of discrimination must always disprove the "legitimate reasons" proffered by the employer in order to prove discrimination.

In a week that that the state's top appeals court chose to hear the Bianca Jagger eviction case, NYCOA appeared to be dodging an overt power play by the Appellate Division, to legislate "from the bench" new case law that will now make proving discrimination by plaintiffs in disability and Title VII cases extremely more difficult, as well as avoiding a politically charged situation involved the trial judge's appointment to the higher court in the middle of a judicial investigation. The decision will also open the door for employers to get a "second bite at the apple" when they lose cases for legal reasons after agreeing to the jury instructions.

The hearing of the Jordan appeal would have allowed the top court to resolve an important issue of law, specifically the legal burden for proving "pretext" in discrimination cases, a matter that has been inconsistently adjudicated by lower New York courts. Jordan's appellate attorney Robert Meister argued in their briefs that while the First Department held, as WPP's attorneys had argued, that a victim of discrimination must always disprove the "legitimate reason" for the adverse employment action, courts outside New York had aligned around the "real reason" standard, which requires that the analysis advance to a third level where the motivations of the employer are considered. Meister argued in their briefs that while disproving the "legitimate reason" can be helpful to proving discrimination, it is not necessary to do so.

"It's the 'blue eyes defense,' Meister argued. "It's like saying we fired her because she had blue eyes...and then proving that her eyes are blue, and suggesting that this disposes of the fact that the employer was motivated by discrimination."

Under McDonnell Douglas, the standard for proving discrimination established by the United States Supreme Court, a plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination must proffer a "prima facie" case, while the employer must only produce a "legitimate reason" that it does not have to prove, while the plaintiff ultimately bearing the burden of proving that the employer was motivated by discrimination and that the "real reason" was discrimination. In finding that Jordan "presented no evidence of pretext" to rebut the "legitimate reasons" offered by WPP's attorneys, and therefore the jury verdict was "against the weight of the evidence", the First Department chose to ignore all of the evidence of discrimination that Jordan produced at trial, including testimony by her and top executives that she was openly referred to as "a cripple", hazed about her need to use a cane to ambulate, and treated differently by her supervisors than her non disabled peers, including being paid half what non-disabled EVP's were compensated. The First Department also ignored evidence that decision maker Doug Fidoten, who fired Jordan, "could not say" whether it was more cost effective to terminate her or not, evidence that her termination as the agency's top Planning executive was not part of the mid 1994 merger layoffs which targeted non-client staff positions, and evidence that the defendants were hiring planners at the very time that they claimed "financial problems" were the reason for terminating Jordan. Instead, the First Department, incensed about Jordan's criticisms about the trial Judge's "ex parte" communications, allegations which they deemed "baseless" instead of investigating, focused on the omission from evidence of a document that proved one of her non disabled replacements' compensation, as the basis for finding that there was "no evidence" to "rebut the legitimate reason".

The reason for the First Department's decision was clearly political. The First Department, in ignoring the high hurdle for disturbing jury verdicts in this state, as well as the fact that WPP waived the right to appeal when it agreed to the jury instructions, deployed the artifice of outrage about a dispute between the trial judge and the plaintiff to divert attention from the fact that they were "legislating from the bench" changes to the state's anti-discrimination laws that would make it harder to prove discrimination. The Appellate panel expressed outrage about Jordan's allegation of misconduct by the trial judge, Honorable Judge Rolando T. Acosta, and her allegations of improper "ex parte" communications with her discharged attorney, Laurence Lebowitz. Jordan complained that the trial judge had pressured her to agree to pay Lebowitz over $1 million in legal fees, despite his negligence in documenting Jordan's economic damages and evidence on the case. Acosta had also sanctioned Jordan calling her "contemptuous" after reporting Lebowitz' improper filing of pleadings on the case after his discharge as counsel of record, and after his attempts to censure her complaints failed. Acosta eventually recused himself from the case.

The Kathryn Jordan v. Bates Advertising et al case was tried in Supreme Court before Judge Acosta, a jurist ironically once appointed by Judge Judith Kaye, Chief Judge of the NYCOA, to oversee the commission to Promote Public Confidence in the Justice System. Acosta, who rose through the ranks of the Human Rights Division, published a lengthy opinion in February 2007 endorsing the jury verdict of April 2005 in favor of Jordan and affirming the finding that defendants Bates/AC&R Advertising had "discriminated against Jordan on the basis of 'perceived disability'". This finding necessitated accepting the jury's credibility determinations of Jordan as a witness. The Court also affirmed the damages award, including $2.0M in economic damages, declining to adjust the 60% reduction in "make whole" damages proven by Jordan's unrebutted expert. WPP's attorneys refused to settle the case over the decade leading up to the 11 day jury trial, insisting on trying the case before a jury, knowing that fatal admissions by Bates/AC&R management made it virtually impossible for WPP to win. Consequently, Jordan, who suffers from Multiple Sclerosis, and who has been recognized for her contributions to the advancement of women and the disabled in the workplace, had to finance, and endure, 13 years of litigation. "It has been an incredible ordeal," Jordan admitted. "No intelligent person one files a discrimination case as a profit making venture. Nor does any sane person accuse a judge of misconduct without reason."

Jordan who was criticized by the First Department for masking her disability at the time of her hire as EVP Planning, a $250,000 base salary position, for not reporting the harassment to her supervisors who testified that they knew at the time that she was openly referred to as "a cripple" by colleagues but failed to take remedial action, for Jordan's not complaining about her supervisor's interrogations about her need to ambulate with a cane, and for negotiating a "reason for leaving" that would not reveal the fact that she had been fired for discriminatory reasons to future employers. Bates senior management admitted that there was no enforcement of EEO policy. The jury was outraged and awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Jordan.

"The (First Department) decision (to reverse the verdict) read like something out of a 1950's 'blame the victim' employer manual," Jordan said. "We obviously still have a long way to go."

Details about this case will be posted on EndDiscriminationNow.com beginning December 1st, 2008.

SOURCE EndDiscriminationNow.com

First Department Appellate Division, aided by Drinker Biddle, fix case for errant Supreme Court jurist

For Immediate Release:

November 24^th, 2008, New York, N. Y.: An Appellate Division First Department panel, including Judges Jonathon Lippman, David Friedman, Luis Gonzales and two now retired jurists, Judge Sullivan and Patterson, operated in concert to cover up misconduct by a judicial candidate, Honorable Judge Rolando T. Acosta. Judge Acosta, a Supreme Court jurist, appointed by Elliot Spitzer as a candidate for the higher court in the fall of 2007, had overseen a jury trial in the case of Kathryn Jordan v. Bates Advertising et al, #118785-99, and had issued an Opinion in February 2006 affirming the jury’s verdict in favor of the Plaintiff. However, during the legal fee hearing portion of the litigation, Jordan fired her trial attorney, explaining to the court that Mr. Lebowitz’ numerous errors in handling of evidence and preparation and examination of experts had led to the 60% reduction in damages on the case, a decision that Judge Acosta was incensed with.

Consequently, on April 3^rd, 2006, almost one year after the jury voted in Jordan’s favor,

Judge Acosta entertained an “ex parte” meeting with Lebowitz where he presented “evidence” supporting his claim for over $1 million in legal fees. Neither Jordan or her adversary, Drinker Biddle attorneys Gregory Homer and Donald Beshada, were present during the meeting because Homer had conveniently waved his right to attend. Shortly after the Lebowitz discussion, Jordan was called in by Judge Acosta and advised that Judge Acosta would “act as a fact witness” against her if she proceeded with her plans to file a malpractice case against Lebowitz. Jordan said she was undeterred. Acosta then

began entertaining “ex parte” pleadings from Lebowitz, at a time when he had been clearly discharged as “Counsel of Record” for Jordan. This led to two sets of pleadings being filed for Plaintiff during this period. After a number of attempts by Jordan to secure the court’s agreement to cease the “ex parte” misconduct, Jordan filed a complaint with the Commission on Judicial Misconduct.

Jordan then asked for Judge Acosta’s recusal. His initial reaction was to sanction Jordan for allegedly violating a gag order he put into the case at this time, an order that all of the attorneys technically violated on the case. Jordan was the only party sanctioned. Then Judge Acosta’s chambers leaked a biased story about the case to the Law Journal, spinning the “facts” to make Jordan appear to be an out of control Pro Se litigant.(The Law Journal confirmed this report a few months later). Finally in November 2006, Judge Acosta issued his “Final Judgment”. While he upheld the jury verdict and the law upon which the case was tried, Judge Acosta then issued a 7 page vitriolic attack on the disabled Jordan, calling her “contemptuous” and “contumacious” for making the “baseless” allegations. In his Judgment, though, he never directly denied making the threats to Jordan nor having the “ex parte” meetings with Lebwitz. He simply characterized the complaints as “baseless”. A subsequent investigation by the Commission on Misconduct cited “insufficient evidence” of misconduct.

During the period, September to December 2007, Judge Acosta was being vetted for the position on the Appellate Division Court. Having courted the legal community for decades with his activist views on attorney compensation, Acosta was able to easily secure references from the attorneys involved in many of the cases he adjudicated. One source cited Drinker Biddle as a reference source.

.Here is where the timing of the events gets very interesting.

On December 27^th,, 2007, less than a month prior to Acosta’s appointment, the Appellate Division panel issued its decision to reverse Acosta’s Judgment based largely on their ostensible outrage that Jordan had made “baseless” allegations about their newly appointed colleague. This Decision openly attacked Jordan’s credibility and adopted verbatim Drinker Biddle’s paraphrasing of evidence and misquoting of Jordan’s testimony. They clearly second guessed the jury’s decision to believe Jordan and disbelieve the numerous pretextual excuses that employer Bates Advertising provided at the time. In doing so, though, they applied standards for evaluating discrimination that were outmoded and inappropriate. For example, they criticized Jordan for not disclosing her disability at hire, or report the harassment to “others”, when it was known that her supervisors were her harassers. They also reached far into other litigations where an off handed comment by Jordan that Bates “had financial problems, they lost big accounts”, was interpreted as an “admission” that it was not discrimination but finances that caused her termination. They also focused on the omission of a document that proved her non disabled replacements’ compensation as dispositive of the case “as a matter of law” because the absence of this was tantamount to “insufficiency of evidence” in terms of disproving Bates’s pretext of “financial reasons” or cost efficiency. This document could only have supported a “matter of law” issue if the Appellate panel also disregarded the admission of decision maker Fidoten who stated that he “did not know” if it was more cost effective to fire Jordan or not.

There was also a completely misapplied argument that Jordan was obligated to disprove the “legitimate reason” of the employer in order to prove discrimination, proffered by defense counsel for WPP, Drinker Biddle, which was incredibly adopted by the Appellate Division as the law of the case. This was despite the fact that Drinker had already waived any right to dispute the law of the case when they agreed to the jury instructions.

All of these deviant factoids were then used to justify reversing the jury verdict and dismissing the case. Normally the standard for reversing jury verdicts is extremely high: the judge would have to have made an error of law or the jury misinterpreted the facts of the case. Neither was applicable here. However, in instances where these types of decisions are rendered by appellate courts, the remedy is re-trial of the case, not reversal.

Behind the scenes, Washington based Drinker Biddle, attorneys for WPP as defendants in this case, pulled the strings. It is apparent that a deal was struck whereby the case would be thrown out, despite the abundant evidence that the employer had discriminated. Drinker Biddle had refused to settle the case over the decade preceding trial. Instead they deployed a series of hard ball tactics to wear Jordan, a disabled woman with Multiple Sclerosis, down. The Record shows that Drinker refused to conduct discovery with Jordan and incited trouble with her attorneys. Pre trial judge York was pre-occupied with his Times Square pornography case at the time and never once even met with Jordan. The case was tried like a rape trial, with Jordan’s sanity and integrity assaulted by innuendo. Drinker’s attorneys agreed to the jury instructions or the law of the case. The case was tried over 11 days. Drinker lost. They did secure a 60% reduction in Jordan’s damages prove by her unrebutted expert. Drinker then filed post trial motions in May 2006 which they also lost.

In January 2007 Drinker Biddle filed what should have been a frivolous appeal.

They had agreed to the jury instructions, so there was no bona fide mechanism for claiming the law of the case was not correct. However, they saw in the Acosta-Lebowitz drama an opportunity to change the cast of the die. Inciting the Lebowitz “ex parte” misconduct from behind the scenes, and failing to report Lebowitz improper role in the case at that time, Drinker orchestrated a situation where Jordan was targeted for the judge’s scathing attack. Drinker had a political motive however. The DC law firm knew that the Appellate Division would “play ball” once the case was keyed up to challenge the jury. They also knew that Acosta was a candidate for appellate panel at that time. When Acosta attacked Jordan’s allegations as “baseless”, Drinker remained silent even though they knew that Jordan had been unfairly attacked and despite their first hand knowledge that Acosta was manipulating the proceeding so that Lebowitz would continue to have a “role”.

Despite the cloud of misconduct, and the Spitzer debacle, Judge Acosta was quickly appointed in January 2008 to the Appellate Division as one of the new judges

In the end the inconceivable occurred: a bona fide jury verdict was reversed, a judge who should have been censured was promoted and rewarded for his misconduct,

and Drinker Biddle not only won hundreds of thousands more in legal fees, they “saved” their client WPP over three million dollars in damages.

Jordan, who endured 13 years of litigation in her pursuit of justice, then filed the malpractice cases against Lebowitz that Judge Acosta had threatened to “act as a fact witness” against her on. Colleague Supreme Court Jurist Marcy Friedman dismissed the case before discovery, disregarding all of the allegations and facts.

Jordan is appealing before none other than….the Appellate Division.

Dated: November 24^th, 2008

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2132 118785 Jordan v Bates Adv. Holdings, Inc.

Citation: 2132 118785

Neutral citation: 2007 NY App Div (1st Dept) 2229

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Legal status: Opinion

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Jurisdiction: New York Appellate Division First Department

Decision date: Thursday, 27 December 2007

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Citation: list of in going and out going citations to the present case

Citator: list of judicial treatments of the present case

Page 1, 2132 118785/99, 1

Jordan v Bates Adv. Holdings, Inc. 2007 NY Slip Op 10465 [46 AD3d 440] December 27, 2007 Appellate Division, First Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. As corrected through Wednesday, February 13, 2008 Kathryn Jordan, Respondent-Appellant, v Bates Advertising Holdings, Inc., Formerly Known as AC & R Advertising, Inc., Appellant-Respondent, et al., Defendant. Klein Zelman Rothermel LLP, Nonparty Intervenor-Respondent.

- [*1] Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, Washington, D.C. (Gregory W. Homer, of the District of Columbia bar, admitted pro hac vice, of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

Pedowitz & Meister LLP, New York City (Robert A. Meister of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Klein Zelman Rothermel LLP, New York City (Laurence J. Lebowitz of counsel), for respondent.

Amended judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Rolando T. Acosta, J.), entered January 10, 2007, inter alia, awarding plaintiff damages, after jury trial, on her cause of action for disability discrimination, in the principal amounts of $2,000,000 compensatory and $500,000 punitive, plus attorneys' fees in the principal total of $257,428.71, and imposing a $5,000 sanction against her, and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered February 27, 2006, which denied the motion by defendant Bates Advertising Holdings, formerly known as AC & R Advertising for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, unanimously modified, on the law, the motion granted, the verdict set aside, and the judgment insofar as it awarded damages and attorneys' fees vacated, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter an amended judgment imposing the sanction and dismissing the complaint.

In this disability discrimination action, plaintiff was hired as a senior vice president by a small New York City advertising agency, AC & R Advertising (AC & R) in January 1994 after working as a consultant for the company since November of the preceding year. Plaintiff's responsibilities included providing strategic planning on AC & R's accounts, in particular on the Foot Locker and Estee Lauder accounts. During the summer of 1994, the company merged with Bates Advertising Holdings, USA, Inc (Bates USA) and changed its name to Bates Advertising [*2] Holdings, Inc.^{Footnote 1} [FN1] Plaintiff was terminated less than a year later in March 1995.

In January 1996, plaintiff brought disability, sex and age discrimination charges before the New York State Division of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Plaintiff then brought a federal action against AC & R and Bates USA, alleging discharge in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.

On August 9, 1999, the District Court (Rakoff, J.) granted both defendants summary dismissal of the federal claims with prejudice and dismissed the state claims without prejudice. On February 16, 2001, the judgment was affirmed. Meanwhile, on September 8, 1999, plaintiff commenced this action under the State and City Human Rights Laws (Executive Law § 296; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107) claiming, inter alia, termination of her employment because she was perceived to be disabled. Plaintiff sought damages for lost wages and emotional distress, punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations and collateral estoppel grounds, relying on the federal holding that plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to discredit their stated reason for her termination.

By decision dated January 8, 2001, Supreme Court (Louis York, J.) dismissed the action, holding, inter alia, the disability claim untimely. On appeal, this Court reinstated the claim for disability discrimination ( Jordan v Bates Adv. Holdings , 292 AD2d 205 [2002]).

Subsequently, after a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded $2 million in economic damages for termination by AC & R on the basis of disability. Defendant AC & R moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur or a new trial. The court denied defendant's motion, rejecting defendant's sufficiency argument. The court found that plaintiff had proved a prima facie case of termination based on perceived disability, and noted that the jury's rejection of the employer's stated legitimate reasons permits an inference of discrimination.

On appeal, defendant does not raise any issue with plaintiff's prima facie case, but maintains that she did not prove that defendant's proffered legitimate reasons were pretextual.

For the reasons set forth below, this Court agrees.

In order to recover under section 296 of the Executive Law, a three part analysis is required to determine whether a plaintiff has met his/her burden in establishing a discrimination claim ( see Stephenson v Hotel Empls. & Rest. Empls. Union Local 100 of AFL-CIO , 6 NY3d 265 , 270 [2006]). A plaintiff in a discriminatory termination action has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the prima facie case with a legitimate reason, and then again shifts to the plaintiff to show that defendant's reasons are pretextual. The burden of persuasion of the ultimate issue of discrimination always remains with the plaintiff ( id. at 270-271).

At trial, plaintiff established that she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (MS) in 1992. She further testified that she was using a cane as a result of her MS when she was hired by AC & R's executive vice president Douglas Fidoten as a consultant in November 1993. When she was asked about the cane, she said it was due to a skiing injury. In December 1993, she met with AC & R president Steve Bennett and chief operating officer Harry Koenig, who both asked about her use of a cane and again she gave the skiing injury lie. Bennett offered plaintiff a permanent job [*3] which included working on the Foot Locker account. She was subsequently made an executive vice president at an annual salary of $125,000.

According to plaintiff, in February-March 1994, Bennett, Koenig and Fidoten repeatedly questioned her about her use of the cane and inquiries about the cane were still being made after August 1994. She felt that they believed she had a disability, and that if she revealed the truth she would be fired. However, she did not complain to anyone at AC & R about the inquiries as to her use of the cane. Plaintiff further testified that, at a rehearsal for a client presentation, Fidoten knocked over her cane which was leaning on her chair, and laughed with another executive, while commenting sarcastically "we've got a cripple." Plaintiff also did not mention this comment to anyone at the company.

In the summer of 1994, AC & R merged with Bates, its parent company. Plaintiff testified that, in December 1994 Fidoten told her that AC & R cannot "afford everyone." She was never reviewed or evaluated, but by the beginning of 1995, plaintiff had been relieved of her responsibilities on the Estee Lauder account. She was subsequently told that she was being terminated effective March 1995.

Both Bennett and Fidoten, as well as other agency executives, testified that plaintiff's termination was financially motivated, and that a merger and the loss of major clients had precipitated layoffs of a large portion of the workforce, including executives more highly placed than plaintiff.

Bates's former chief financial officer, Art D'Angelo testified that as a result of the Bates-AC & R merger, approximately half of the staff at AC & R was terminated. D'Angelo believed that Fidoten had terminated plaintiff as a cost cutting measure since account planning activities at Bates and AC & R were duplicative. He testified that in late 1994-early 1995, the parent of both Bates and AC & R, Saatchi & Saatchi, had lost major accounts when Saatchi's founders left. This required restructuring the Bates worldwide network and making personnel cuts as a way of cutting costs.

Bates's personnel manager, Anne Melanson, testified that there were many layoffs for budget reasons. While it was customary to try to transfer people to related entities, this was not possible because during 1994 both of AC & R's corporate parents (Saatchi and Bates) were losing business.

Fidoten testified that around the time plaintiff was terminated one of AC & R's biggest accounts, Estee Lauder, was looking at other agencies, an action which threatened AC & R's viability. He further testified that many jobs were eliminated to avoid duplication when AC & R was merged with Bates. They included senior executives at AC & R such as Koenig, a vice chairman and its chief operating officer, and an executive vice president, Shelly Marks. Fidoten acknowledged that he had decided to terminate plaintiff on the grounds that she was one of the most expensive employees and Bates already had many others performing her planning function. Fidoten further testified that plaintiff was not replaced. Instead, AC & R provided services to Footlocker by using Bates's staff.

The defendant's overwhelming and consistent evidence of financial reasons for layoffs in the light of the merger and the loss of major client accounts was undisputed. Thus, the finding that defendant failed to demonstrate a legitimate reason for terminating plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence.

Moreover, plaintiff presented no evidence of pretext, and so failed to controvert defendant's evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. On the [*4] contrary, plaintiff acknowledged that the merger in 1994 caused many layoffs for economic reasons. She admitted that when she was terminated, Estee Lauder, a major account she worked on, was considering taking its business elsewhere, and that AC & R was facing financial pressures.^{Footnote 2} [FN2]

Further, in plaintiff's separation memo in February 1995 in which she sought references and help with networking, she wrote: "For the purposes of outside communication, I think the elimination of my position as part of the Bates USA AC & R integration would be sufficient."

Additionally, while plaintiff elicited evidence from Fidoten that a nondisabled woman in her late 20s to mid 30s, Jill Kosoff, was hired in November 1994 and put to work on the Footlocker account, performing the planning function that plaintiff had performed, there was no testimony as to the employee's salary. By failing to come forth with any evidence that hiring Ms. Kosoff was just as expensive, or that hiring her and also using Bates' personnel was just as expensive as keeping plaintiff employed, plaintiff failed to meet her burden as a matter of law.

Thus, because there was no evidence to rebut defendant's showing of a legitimate reason for the termination, we find that no jury could have reached the verdict in this case on any fair interpretation of the evidence. Therefore, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence (see White v New York City Tr. Auth. , 40 AD3d 297 [2007]). Since it was plaintiff's ultimate burden to prove discrimination and also her burden to prove that the proffered legitimate reason for her termination was pretextual, we find that the motion to set aside the verdict should have been granted. Further, inasmuch as plaintiff, as a result of our decision, is no longer the prevailing party, she is not entitled to any award of attorneys' fees ( see McGrath v Toys "R" Us, Inc. , 3 NY3d 421 , 429 [2004]). It is thus unnecessary to reach plaintiff's contentions regarding such fees.

Finally, the imposition of a sanction of $5,000 on the plaintiff was a proper exercise of discretion. Plaintiff's conduct after the court directed a hearing to determine the amount of attorneys' fees was egregious and repeated. The record shows that plaintiff pro se relentlessly bombarded the court with letters and faxes accusing the court of ex parte communications, declaring her intention to depose the court, and claiming that her now-former trial attorney had committed serious errors costing her millions in damages.^{Footnote 3} [FN3] Although the court recognized that [*5] plaintiff was proceeding pro se after trial, it properly observed that she was nevertheless obliged to comply with court orders and not make baseless accusations regarding the court's integrity. Concur-Lippman, P.J., Friedman, Sullivan, Gonzalez and Catterson, JJ. Footnotes

____________________

[Footnote 1]

Footnote 1: For clarity, the company will be referred to as AC & R throughout this memorandum.

[Footnote 2]

Footnote 2: In a separate action against a former employer, she had also testified that the reason for her termination by AC & R was "they had layoffs. They lost big accounts."

[Footnote 3]

Footnote 3: Plaintiff's numerous letters to the court between March and August 2006 resulted in two major admonitions of her by the court. On April 19 2006, the court ordered her (boldface in the letter) not to contact the court or its staff except as to issues pending before it, and directed that as to those issues she must copy defendants. However, plaintiff's relentless letter-writing continued until in open court on June 29, the judge repeated that he did not want any further communication with the court until a decision was rendered ("zero communication . . . not a letter from your doctor or a proposal to submit a letter . . . I beg you to just leave me alone."). The court's clear statement notwithstanding, by letter dated July 18, 2006, plaintiff again accused Justice Acosta of ex parte communications (a "shameful charade . . . while you looked the other way"), complained of the delay in deciding the fee matter, and asked that he transfer it to another judge. On August 12, 2006, plaintiff moved to "recall" the court's decision, recapping her letter accusations; moved, using strong language, for Justice Acosta's recusal on the fee matter on the ground of bias; and sought administrative relief from another Justice whereupon the court sanctioned plaintiff, chronicling plaintiff's communications especially the July 18, 2006 letter.